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Abstract: It is beneficial for telecommunication authorities and Internet service providers (ISPs) to classify and detect
voice traﬃc. It can help them to block unsubscribed users from using their services, which saves them huge revenues.
Voice packets can be detected easily, but it becomes complicated when the application or port information in the
packet header is hidden due to some secure mechanism such as encryption. This work provides eﬀective voice packet
classification and detection based on behavioral and statistical analysis, which is independent of any application, security
protocol, or encryption mechanism. First we have made initial assessments through packet feature analysis followed by
the implementation of a voice detection algorithm to perform statistical analysis for classifying traﬃc over IP networks.
The proposed voice detection algorithm is executed in three phases: registering of packet flow traces, signature-based
analysis, and voice classification. In the first phase, new packets are registered. In the second phase, registered packets are
tested if they are already marked as detected. In the third phase, the voice detection algorithm works at distinguishing
encrypted and nonencrypted voice flows by fine-tuning the parameters, which are chosen after a detailed statistical
analysis of datasets on security protocols such as secure socket layer, secure session initiation protocol, and secure realtime transport protocol. Our results demonstrate a high true positive rate (TPR) and very low false alarm rate (FAR).
The proposed methodology achieves a TPR of 93.6% for oﬄine traces, 100% for the self-configured voice setups, and
95% for the online traﬃc. The FAR is 0.000084% for oﬄine traces and 0.00020% for online traces, which shows that the
proposed methodology is highly eﬃcient and can be incorporated in contemporary telecommunication systems.
Key words: Traﬃc classification, Voice over Internet Protocol, secure socket layer, encrypted and decrypted voice

1. Introduction
Similar to other services on IP networks, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) traﬃc can be eavesdropped,
hacked, or spoofed, which results in serious security threats to VoIP users as well as to service providers. VoIP
users can use security protocols on both the sending and receiving sides to guard their media sessions, whereas
VoIP service providers cannot use security protocols. They can protect their services by detecting illegal voice
traﬃc and stopping or blocking it. In this way, VoIP providers can save additional profits that cannot be earned
otherwise.
The practice of typecasting computer network traﬃc based on diversified constraints such as port numbers
and protocols into distinct traﬃc classes is called traﬃc classification. Several traﬃc classification techniques
reported in the literature use deep packet inspection to identify specific VoIP applications by creating a reference
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database, which requires a continuous updating of signatures [1–3]. Pattern-based techniques are dependent
on signaling mechanisms as each application has its own signaling patterns [4]. Traﬃc classification techniques
based on source and destination IP addresses or source and destination ports [5] are limited to some extent due
to hiding transport and network layer information through encryption mechanisms.
In this work, we propose a more precise generic voice packet classification and detection technique based
on packet features and statistical analysis. The proposed method is independent of an application, security
protocol, or encryption mechanism for voice traﬃc over IP networks with low probability of false alarm. It
first makes initial assessments through packet feature analysis and then performs statistical analysis on the
acquired data by following the proposed voice detection algorithm. We have performed analysis on diﬀerent
voice and nonvoice applications such as Skype, Yahoo messenger, Gmail, MSN messenger, user voice setups
with diﬀerent configurations, and Facebook. We also analyze other applications such as Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail,
media sessions, online gaming, torrent downloading, and online live TV. The aforementioned applications along
with additional applications like Tencent QQ messenger, Trillian IM, and TEAMtalk have been used for testing
purposes. Test results demonstrate that the proposed voice traﬃc detection technique not only exhibits low
false alarm rates but it is also adaptable by telecommunication authorities and ISPs to detect voice traﬃc.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the related work. The proposed strategy for
traﬃc classification is presented in Section 3. Details about our experimental setup and datasets are provided
in Section 4. Results and performance analysis are presented in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are presented in
Section 6.
2. Related work
Traﬃc classification techniques are helpful to categorize diverse applications and protocols that exist in a
network and to detect the voice traﬃc over IP networks. These classification techniques are organized as portbased, pattern analysis, statistical analysis, deep packet inspection, heuristic analysis, and numerical analysis
techniques. In port-based techniques [1], packets are classified based on the fields of the packet header such as
the source or destination ports at the transport layer. It is an ultimate, customary, and simple technique but less
accurate [5]. Pattern-based techniques perform analysis on the signaling pattern where certain patterns such as
bytes, characters, or strings are embedded in the application. These patterns help in identifying applications
or protocols [4]. This technique entirely depends on the call signaling mechanism of VoIP traﬃc. Standard
and proprietary protocols can be powerfully exploited by inspecting the signaling patterns. The drawback
of this technique exists due to the fact that the pattern for every application is diﬀerent and therefore not
generic. In signature-based analysis/deep packet inspection, every application has its own unique signature that
symbolizes its unique characteristics and a reference database is created. This reference is then used to identify
the application and needs to be updated periodically [1–3]. Techniques based on numerical analysis involve
numerical attributes of the traﬃc like payload size, oﬀsets, and number of response packets [6]. Techniques
using behavior or heuristic analysis investigate the behavior [5,7,8] and heuristics [4] of the network traﬃc,
which sometimes yield better insight to identify the application. In [9], port-based analysis is used as helping
information to detect VoIP. Pattern-based detection usually involves machine learning techniques, which were
first used in traﬃc classification for intrusion detection [10]. In [11], supervised learning was used with three
extractable properties of IP packets: packet length, interarrival time, and order of arrival. The parameters are
used to develop protocol fingerprints. In [12] a decision algorithm was used to classify traﬃc by categorizing
the Internet flowe into classes such as web-browsing, email, bulk FTP, and P2P. The accuracy achieved by this
algorithm is around 99%.
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Most of the research in the literature includes SSH or SS traﬃc rather than purely focusing on tunneling
approaches like IPSec. In [7], the authors proposed an empirical method based on the hidden Markov model for
the type of applications using tunneled protocols and demonstrated an accuracy of 20%. Some heuristic methods
have been also explored based on the characteristics of the host behaviors. In [11], an approach based on the
behavior of P2P peers was proposed. In [13], a multilevel traﬃc classification named BLINC was developed.
Similarly, in [14], a methodology based on data mining and information theoretic techniques was proposed
to discover the behavioral patterns of the hosts and the services provided by the hosts. In [15], the authors
used a machine learning algorithm on subflows using features based on mean packet length, autocorrelation,
and the ratio of data transmitted on both sides to identify variable rate VoIP flows. In [16], the authors used
the Skype framing structure and exploited randomness during the encryption process, and secondly proposed
a naı̈ve Bayesian classifier by characterizing Skype traﬃc in terms of packet arrival rate and packet lengths.
These algorithms are application-specific and successfully identify those applications even with variable data
rates or diﬀerent versions of them. These heuristic algorithms assume that only one network application has
been in execution at one host. In reality, multiple applications may coexist.
In this work we propose a time-eﬃcient voice packet classification and detection technique, which is a
hybrid approach based on behavioral and statistical analysis of an input packet. All the packets are sorted into
voice and nonvoice packets by using behavioral analysis. The packets are then further classified and confirmed
as voice or nonvoice using statistical analysis. That helps in reducing the false alarm rate. Once a packet is
classified correctly, it is marked as a voice or nonvoice packet. That makes our algorithm time-eﬃcient as no
statistical analysis is performed when packets of the same flow enter the next time. The main contribution
of this paper is to analyze voice and nonvoice traﬃc, which is not application-specific, and then to classify
incoming packets in the future as voice or nonvoice without any prior information.
3. The proposed strategy for identifying voice traﬃc
In our work, we first take IP traﬃc, separate out distinct flows, and analyze their features based on their flow
parameters. In the second step, statistical approaches further improve the results to classify the voice traﬃc. We
first work on the test data by capturing voice and nonvoice traces in our own setup for a number of applications
to train the system. We have validated our proposed algorithm on datasets collected from 3rd party websites. A
systematic procedure to execute the proposed flow-based analysis followed by our statistical model applicable to
voice and nonvoice flows is presented below. We first present packet size distribution (PSD) to examine packet
size and minimum and maximum packet size to define the range and variation in packet size with respect to
their frequencies for both voice and nonvoice traces. PSDs of bidirectional flows for voice-based applications
such as Zfone-Asterisk-Xlite, Yahoo messenger, MSN messenger, Google Talk (Gtalk), Eyebeam-Asterisk-Blink,
and Skype are illustrated in Figure 1. By looking at PSDs of all voice traces, we can observe that the PSD of
Skype voice traces has more variations as compared to Gtalk. Applications like Eyebeam-Asterisk-Blink and
Zfone-Asterisk-Xlite show much less deviation because they are voice-specific applications and use codecs like
G.711, which maintain almost constant data rates. The PSDs of voice-based traces have low packet sizes. For
example, Skype has a packet size of 45–216 bytes, Gtalk has a packet size of 67–230 bytes, and MSN messenger
has a packet size of 117–147 bytes.
In Figure 1, it can be seen that there are packets of small sizes, but the most frequent packets of Yahoo
messenger (90 and 131 bytes), Eyebeam-Asterisk-Blink (224 bytes), and Zfone-Asterisk-Xlite (218 bytes) have
packet sizes in the range of 90–220 bytes. As voice flows have small packet sizes, they are in low ranges. These
low variations in packet sizes guarantee the low jitter and delay in delivering voice packets at the receiving end.
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Figure 1. Packet size distributions of the voice flows.
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Figure 2. Packet size distributions of the nonvoice flows.
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Bidirectional PSDs of nonvoice traces provide two observations. As shown on the left-hand side in Figure
2, most frequent packets of flows A to B have low packet sizes. For example, Facebook has 66 bytes, Gmail has
54 bytes, Yahoo Mail has 54 bytes, Online Live TV has 54 and 66 bytes, Torrent has 54 bytes, and YouTube has
54 bytes. The packet size ranges from 54 to 66 bytes, which is low as they all are client requests. As shown in
Figure 2 on the right-hand side, the packet size lies between 1450 and 1550 bytes, and our second observation is
that the flows from B to A have very large packet sizes as they start exchanging data such as pictures, movies,
audio, and video after the login requests by the clients are accepted. Next we examine the packet rate (PR)
of all the traces for each incoming voice and nonvoice packet. PR in flow-based techniques becomes significant
as it provides the whole statistics of how may packets (Ps) a flow sends in every second (T). PR defines the
average packet size for a specific time.
PR =

ΣPi
ΣTi

(1)

Figures 3a and 3b show that the PRs of voice-dependent applications are quite high.
High packet rates depict the best quality of voice service. As voice applications are real-time applications
they are sensitive to the delivery rate. Every data packet should reach its destination within its allowed time,
or else it has no significance and is discarded.
Figure 4 presents the PRs of nonvoice application traces in both directions from A→ B and B → A. As it
is shown, PRs of nonvoice traces like YouTube, Torrent, and Online TVs are high in contrast to voice traces but
their PSDs are diﬀerent from the voice flows. PR and PSD provide vital information for traﬃc classification
like the number of packets, interarrival time of packets, variation in packet size, packet rate, maximum and
minimum packet size, and the range of packet size. Packet feature analysis on PRs and PSD of voice and
nonvoice traces can lead to three main observations: 1) voice application traces have small packet sizes of ∼60
bytes as compared to nonvoice packets of ∼90 bytes; 2) voice application traces have low variations in packets,
within the range of 0 to 100, whereas nonvoice applications can have variations of greater than 100; 3) voice
application traces have high packet rates, greater than 12.
3.1. Voice detection algorithm
The behaviors of both voice and nonvoice traﬃc vary when the traﬃc is tunneled or encrypted through protocols
like SRTP, SSL/TLS, MGCP, SIP, SMIME, or IPSec. That requires defining more precise boundaries for
diﬀerentiating voice and nonvoice traﬃc. For this, we have extended our analysis by including more features
like number of packets, total flow time, arithmetic mean, standard deviation, packet rate, and minimum and
maximum size of the packet. Based on our deep analysis for traﬃc using secure protocols, the following algorithm
works well for classification of voice and nonvoice traﬃc.
As shown above, the algorithm starts by measuring the total flowe time and total number of packets from
the first packet to the current packet when flowe F is not yet detected as voice or nonvoice flowe. The algorithm
keeps updating the flowe parameter values such as total flowe time, total flowe packets, sum of packet lengths
and sum of packet lengths squares, minimum packet size, and maximum packet size until the flowe time exceeds
10 s or the total number of flowe packets exceeds 120. When both the conditions are met it computes values
such as average of packet sizes, variation of packet sizes (standard deviation), packet rate, maximum packet size,
minimum packet size, and range of packet size of the flowe. The packet is declared as a voice packet when the
computed values stand within threshold constraints as described in Step 4 of the voice detection algorithm, but
if statistical values of that flowe do not match the system threshold parameters then it is identified as nonvoice
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Figure 3. a) Packet rate of voice-based traces: Facebook, Gtalk, MSN Messenger. b) Packet rate of voice-based traces:
Blink, Xlite, Yahoo messenger.
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Figure 4. Packet rate of nonvoice traces.

flowe. Flows that have less than 120 packets within 10 s will be detected as nonvoice flowes by default through
the proposed solution.

4. Experimental setup
For the voice detection algorithm and analysis of the captured traces we use a dual core 2.26 GHz processor with 6 GB RAM under the Windows 7 operating system. The test setup captures both online
and ofline traces. Online traces are captured by observing the communication between various voice and
nonvoice traces for almost 3 h. Ofline traces are collected from 3rd party websites such as Wireshark
(https://wiki.wireshark.org/SampleCaptures) and Skype (http://tstat.polito.it/traces-skype.shtml). These traces
comprise voice-based application traces, their own voice setup traces, nonvoice traces, and mixed traﬃc. Voicebased application traces like Skype version 6.1.129, Yahoo! messenger version 11.5.0.228, Gtalk Beta Version,
MSN messenger 7.0 and 8.5, ooVoo Version 3.5.8.22, Tencent QQ messenger ver 1.75.2548.0, Trillian IM ver
5.3.0.15, and Team Talk 4 are used for voice communications. A simple voice setup is also developed by using
Asterisk as voice server and Eyebeam, Blink, Zfone, and Xlite as voice clients that perform conversation for
encrypted and nonencrypted voice using SRTP and ZRTP protocols for testing purposes. Moreover nonvoice
traces are collected for testing by using applications like Facebook, BitTorrents, YouTube Session, downloading audio and video, Online Live TV, and gaming. Mixed traﬃc consists of both voice and nonvoice traﬃc
simultaneously. Table 1 shows the summary of those testing traces used in testing phase.
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Algorithm:
INPUT: Flow F, Input packet P i, where 0 < I < N
OUTPUT: Flow F is categorized as voice or nonvoice ﬂow
Step 1: Read Pi
(Read a new Packet)
Step 2: Test Pi F(r) or Pi F(ur) (Test if a packet belongs to a registered F(r) or unregistered ﬂow F(ur)
(a) If (Pi F(ur) ) Then
(packet received first time, to be registered)
Register(S-IP, D-IP, S-Port, D-Port)
Initialize (T(ﬂow), N(pkts), MIN(pkt size), MAX(pkt size),SUM(pkt length), SUM
(Sqr pkt length))
(b) If ( T(ﬂow) < 10 OR N(pkts) <120 ) Then
GoTo Step 1
Else
GoTo Step 3 (packet is registered but not detected)
Step 3: Test ( Pi F(voice) OR Pi F(nonvoice) )
(a) If ( Pi F(voice) OR Pi F(nonvoice) ) Then
GoTo Step 1
Else
(Already identified, read the new packet)
GoTo Step 4
(Go for ﬂow identification)
Step 4: Calculate T(ﬂow) & N(pkts)
(for a required time interval)
Step 5: Test ( T(ﬂow)< 10 OR (N(pkts)<120 )
(a) If (True)
Update(T(ﬂow), N(pkts), SUM(pkt length), SUM(Sqr pkt length), MIN(pkt size),
MAX(pkt size)) (Keep updating until total ﬂow time < 10 or total number of packets < 120)
Else
Calculate AVG(pkt size), VAR(pkt size), PR, RANGE(pkt size)
(b) If ( (PR > 12) & (50 < AVG(pkt size) < 250 ) & ( 0 VAR(pkt size) < 100) ) Then
If ( 50 < AVG(pkt size) < 60 ) Then
If (PR ≤ 200) Then
F Flow(voice)
Elsif (PR < 500) Then
F Flow(voice)
Else
F Flow(nonvoice)
End if
End if
End if
End algorithm

5. Performance evaluation of the proposed solution
In this work we have applied statistical analysis to both voice and nonvoice flowes to compute parameters such
as number of packets, total flowe time, arithmetic mean, standard deviation, packet rate, and minimum and
maximum packet size of the captured traces.
As shown in Figure 5a, our three previous observations about a voice flowe are true, i.e. high packet rate
and low mean and standard deviation of packet size. Moreover, the range of packet size is also minimum in the
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Table 1. Test traces.

#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

No. of
traces
Skype version 6.1.129
Voice
11
Yahoo Messenger 11.5.0.228
Voice
5
Gtalk Beta Version
Voice
4
MSN Messenger 7.0, 8.5
Voice
4
Eyebeam-Asterisk-Blink
Voice
8
ooVoo Version 3.5.8.22
Voice
1
Zfone-Asterisk-Xlite
Voice
2
Tencent QQ 1.75.2548.0
Voice
1
Trillian IM ver 5.3.0.15
Voice
1
TEAMtalk 4
Voice
1
Mixed
Voice & nonvoice 1
Facebook
Nonvoice
2
Email server (Hotmail, Yahoo Mail, Gmail) Nonvoice
2
Online game
Nonvoice
1
Online live TV (Geo, Duniya)
Nonvoice
2
Torrent download
Nonvoice
3
Video clips (YouTube, others)
Nonvoice
4
Mixed nonvoice
Nonvoice
2
Application

Type

Max.
duration
980
332
504
88
478
123
2630
57
133
238
1023
370
156
108
204
2043
297
1331

Max.
size
8
2
3
0.6
103
4
4.5
1
1.8
4
65
16
3
4
150
9
112

Transport
layer
UDP
TCP&UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
UDP
TCP&UDP
TCP&UDP
TCP&UDP
TCP&UDP
TCP&UDP
TCP&UDP
TCP&UDP
TCP&UDP

Figure 5. a) Statistical analysis of voice applications. b) Statistical analysis nonvoice applications.

case of voice flowes. Based on this analysis, threshold values of the statistical parameters are fine-tuned for the
proposed voice detection algorithm.
Figure 5b shows the statistical parameter values of diﬀerent flowes on diﬀerent nonvoice applications.
Mainly those applications are considered that have higher packet rates, similar to voice flowe, so that we make a
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clear distinction between voice and nonvoice flowes based on other parameters when the packet rate constraints
match. There is only one flowe, i.e. torrent flowe from A→B, that may be confused with voice flowes but in
such a case we use the range determinant that will diﬀerentiate such flowes from voice flowes. Thus, this article
describes a thorough investigation of both nonvoice and voice flowe parameter values by using prevalent voice
and nonvoice applications. Moreover, it is also observed that the measurements of the values of these evaluated
statistical factors for both voice and nonvoice flowes are quite diﬀerent. Using the empirical analysis carried
out in this research and with the above statistics, voice flowes can easily be identified.
The following are the conventional evaluation parameters used to test the proposed system accuracy: 1)
true positive (TP) - flows that are correctly identified as voice flows; 2) false positive (FP) - flows that are
incorrectly identified as voice flows; 3) false negative (FN) - flows that are incorrectly identified as nonvoice
flows; 4) true negative (TN) - flows that are correctly identified as nonvoice flows.
Table 2 presents total voice calls for applications, which is the product of the number of traces multiplied
by the number of flowes. For example, the Eyebeam-Asterisk-Blink Voice Setup has a total of 8 traces used in
our testing phase multiplied by 2 as there are two flowes involved in a single trace, i.e. A. → g B and B . → g A.
The proposed solution truly detects 103 voices traces out of 110 voice traces. Table 3 presents the evaluation
results of the proposed solution for nonvoice flowes. As shown, the algorithm correctly identifies 59,466 traces
out of 59,471 nonvoice traces. However, 5 nonvoice traces are identified as voice traces. Mixed traces are both
voice and nonvoice traces, which are captured simultaneously.
Table 2. Performance evaluation of voice traces.

Application

Total voice calls

Eyebeam-Asterisk- Blink
Gtalk
MSN Messenger
Yahoo Messenger
Skype
ooVoo
Mix Voice Calls
Tencent QQ Messenger
Trillian IM
aZfone-Asterisk-Xlite
TeamTalk
Total

16
8
8
10
22
2
46
2
2
8
2
110

Our
TP
16
8
8
10
19
1
44
2
2
7
2
103

solution
FN
0
0
0
0
3
1
2
0
0
0
0
7

Table 3. Performance evaluation of nonvoice traces.

Application
Facebook
Mixed nonvoice
Mail servers (Hotmail,YahooMail,Gmail)
Online game
Online live TV (Geo Sports, Duniya)
Torrents
Video clips (YouTube, others)
Total

898

Total voice calls
20,764
8405
253
19
249
22,847
1428
59,471

TN
220,763
8403
253
19
249
22,846
1427
59,466

FP
1
2
0
0
0
1
1
5
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Table 4 shows the evaluation results by applying the algorithm in terms of TP, TN, FP, and FN rates.
As shown, there are 2 TPs and 5506 TNs, demonstrating good detection estimates. We have added two more
parameters to summarize the overall results by the proposed voice detection algorithm. These two parameters
are the direct rate (DR) and false alarm rate (FAR) used in [17] to measure the correctness of the system. There
should be a minimum FAR value and maximum DR value for an eﬃcient and accurate system. According to
[17], the ideal system has 100% DR and 0% FAR. DR provides the percentage of correctly identified voice flowes
and is defined as: DR = TP / (TP + FN) & FPR = FP / (FP + TN). Table 5 summarizes the performance
results of the proposed voice detection algorithm.
Table 4. Performance evaluation of mixed traces.

Mix traces
Mix voice and nonvoice

Total flows
5508

TP
2

FN
0

FP
0

TN
5506

Table 5. Absolute performance evaluation of the proposed methodology.

Traces
Oﬄine traces
Own voice setup traces
Online traﬃc

TP
103
16
19

FN
7
0
1

FP
5
1

TN
59,466
4855

DR
93.6%
100%
95%

FAR
0.000084%
0.00020%

6. Conclusion
We have proposed a new voice packet classification and detection strategy over IP networks. In the first step,
we perform packet feature analysis on voice, nonvoice, and mixed traces for a number of applications and
provide more precise boundaries for packet size distribution and packet rate to separate distinct flowes for voice
and nonvoice applications. We then propose a voice detection algorithm to further improve our results. The
algorithm is based on statistical analysis of both the voice and nonvoice flowes. It is independent of any protocol,
security mechanism, and application. Statistical analysis is performed on the basic parameters to set threshold
constraints on captured datasets for IP traﬃc and is equally applicable for applications making use of security
protocols such as TLS, SRTP, ZRTP, or SIPS. Evaluation of the system is based on online and ofline test suites
and data captured in diﬀerent environments. Our proposed technique has 93.6% TP for ofline traces, 100% TP
for the self-configured voice setups, and 95% TP for the online traﬃc. Our research work has a low FAR of
0.000084% for ofline traces and 0.00020% FAR for online traces. Future work includes parallel implementation
of the proposed algorithm to achieve high-speed gains for real-time traﬃc.
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